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The New Administrative Capital reshapes 
Egypt’s urban landscape thoroughly. 
Nevertheless, empirical research on its 
political economy and spatial imaginaries 
is lacking. Building on a political geogra-
phy framework and extensive qualitative 
fieldwork, we aim at contrasting official 
constructions of space with an analysis of 
the hidden interests, actions, and power 
struggles among its main stakeholders. 
Whereas foreign and private investors are 
officially key to the project, our analysis 
demonstrates that state institutions com-
pete for control over it, providing the 
military with new rent sources. The loca-
tion and size of the new palace indicates 
a lack of democratic conviction, and citi-
zen participation is largely missing.
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Introduction
On 13 March 2015, the Egyptian govern-
ment announced to the public at the 
Economic Development Conference in 
Sharm al-Sheikh the breathtaking mega-
project of the New Administrative Capital 
(or NAC for short)1. Envisioned to be 
inhabited by 5 to 6.5 million people and 
built from scratch in the vast territory of 
the Eastern Desert 40km east of the Cairo 
agglomeration, the project is intended to 
host a new government quarter, including 
the parliament, ministries, the supreme 
council, diplomatic missions, and a new 
president’s palace. Skyscrapers up to 
450m tall were depicted, as well as 30 sub-
projects, one of them being an airport 
larger than London Heathrow and another 
an amusement park four times the size of 
Disneyland. The total investment is esti-
mated at up to 500 billion US dollars. On 
display boards, the mega-project was 
defined as Madīnat al-Jamīʿa, a City for 
Everyone.
The project is remarkable in various ways. 
It absorbs enormous resources in terms of 
planning efforts, space, and money. The 
latter is especially noteworthy, since Egypt 
has faced severe economic problems in 
the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian revolu-
tion against Mubarak and the 2013 coup 
d’état against president Mursi. Second, 
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the history of the project is very colorful, 
since it has been promoted by three very 
different presidential administrations.
However, even though many international 
visitors at the 2015 conference welcomed 
the project as a symbol of new investment 
opportunities, there was also widespread 
criticism. Critics pointed to its high invest-
ment costs and size and fueled doubts 
about the social responsibility of the proj-
ect that some said is meant to host only 
the richest members of the society and to 
serve the government’s interests (e.g. 
Tadamun; Egyptian Streets; Mohie). On 
the other side, the President and ministers 
pointed out several times that the NAC will 
encourage foreign investments, deepen 
international collaborations (e.g. CNN), 
and will not cause any burdens for the 
Egyptian taxpayer, but instead will make a 
profit for the Egyptian treasury (NUCA; 
Ghanīm and ʿAmāra).
Against this background, the lack of 
empirical research on the political econ-
omy and spatial imaginaries of the project 
is astonishing. Therefore, we aim at con-
trasting the officially created images of the 
project with an analysis of the underlying 
and partially hidden interests of the main 
actors and the power struggles among the 
main stakeholders. Building on a political 
geography framework about the strategic 
construction of space, we therefore ana-
lyze examples of the actions and argu-
mentations of central stakeholders con-
cerning three central elements of the 
NAC: first the role of foreign investors, 
second the disavowal of responsibilities 
for project funding, and third locating of 
the presidential palace. This analysis 
enables a deeper understanding of how 
and why the project developed the way it 
did and provides insights into the quality 
and extent of citizen participation.
Theoretical and Methodological 
Background
Theoretically, this article advocates a polit-
ical geography perspective referring to 
Paul Reuber’s idea of strategic construc-
tions of space (Reuber, Konflikte). Reuber 
argues that every actor selectively gathers 
information about his or her environment 
in order to develop clear objectives of 
future actions. At the same time, actors 
aim at enforcing their point of view in a 
way that argumentatively secures their 
objectives in relation to competing actors 
and/or the public. Thereby, they con-
sciously create subjective, selective, and 
condensed images of reality, which 
Reuber calls “strategic constructions of 
space” (Konflikte 22-44; Politische 
Geographie 116-129). These specific con-
structions of space and their underlying 
logics are presented to the addressees as 
quasi-objective presentations of reality, 
whereas they are primarily intended to 
back the actor’s position in the power 
struggle over the production of space 
(Reuber, Politische Geographie 127). Of 
course, an actor can use different strategic 
constructions of space in from one 
addressee to another. Their analysis allows 
an interpretative reconstruction of the hid-
den agendas and aims of the actors 
(Reuber, Politische Geographie 127). 
Therefore, building on such a perspective 
helps to understand the actions and argu-
mentations of project stakeholders.
Of course, organizations do not always act 
coherently. Individual interests often com-
pete within organizations.2 Since our 
paper focuses on the power struggles 
among actors, it nevertheless seems via-
ble to concentrate on the outcome of the 
analyzed actions of stakeholders and to 
largely ignore their internal power strug-
gles, especially since most of them are 
quite hierarchically organized. We investi-
gated the publicly oriented actions and 
argumentations that bring the strategic 
constructions of space of distinct actors 
into life by using publically available jour-
nalistic media sources, speeches, docu-
mentations, and advertisements. The pro-
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cesses within and among the collective 
actors are, however, hard to grasp, espe-
cially because many stakeholders see 
withholding (even public) information 
about such a project as a question of 
national security. Additionally, the involved 
institutions in Egypt are notorious for pro-
tecting their turf and in general do not 
publish sufficient data (Sims 140, 245, 281; 
Wahdan 10, 60). For this reason, a 14-month 
ethnographic field research project was 
carried out, including professional activity 
in the NAC project. During this time, 36 
qualitative interviews were conducted 
with various project participants whose 
identity will remain anonymous, given the 
sensitivity of the topic. With few excep-
tions, the time horizon covers the period 
from spring 2015 to early 2018. The inter-
views were transcribed and a content 
analysis has been made. Afterward, the 
information based on interviews, field 
research, working experience, and public 
sources was triangulated. Since the gath-
ered information was partially contradic-
tory, it underwent an interpretative analy-
sis to reconstruct as well as possible the 
processes that took place in the field.
Pathways to and Basic Components of the 
New Administrative Capital
The history of attempts to relocate the 
governmental center to the desert reaches 
back to the City of Revolution under 
President Nasser in the 1950s. Under his 
successors, presidents Sadat and 
Mubarak, new endeavors to relocate state 
institutions were made in the deserts west 
and east of Cairo, but they all failed due to 
a lack of funds, the resistance of state 
employees, and political circumstances 
(Stewart; Feiler 302-303). Finally, in 2014, 
President Sisi’s government resumed the 
plans of a new capital, which subsequently 
became one of the top priority projects of 
the national development strategy Egypt 
2030 (MPMAR 51-61). Its priority is high-
lighted by the surprising progress the 
project has made in the past few years, 
considering the unsuccessful earlier 
attempts to relocate the governmental 
capital. The motifs of the importance of a 
new capital and the revival of the idea are 
open to speculation, but most interlocu-
tors agree that among the reasons are the 
need for a big vision to legitimize presi-
dential rule and the intention to evacuate 
governmental institutions from the center 
of turmoil that waned only shortly before.
The overall size of the mega-project was 
set at 753 square kilometers, of which 126 
square kilometers were developed in the 
first phase until 2018. The area to be devel-
oped in this first project phase can be 
divided into four large zones (as at 
February 2018):
1. Six so-called Wadian, isolated, green, 
and high-rent residential quarters with at 
least 25,000 units each, including social 
infrastructure and the supply of shops and 
services such as malls, libraries, mosques 
and churches, social care centers, gas sta-
tions, schools, kindergartens, hospitals, 
banks, police stations, citizens’ service 
centers,and club houses.
2. A park complex covering 23 square kilo-
meters in the first phase and 30 square 
kilometers in total. Its serpentine shape 
intends to imitate the course of the River 
Nile.
3. The governmental quarter, containing 
the parliament, ministries, the supreme 
council, diplomatic missions, and other 
government- related and international 
entities.
4. The presidential palace
In the West and Northwest, the project 
area borders on the easternmost quarters 
of Cairo proper (see fig. 1). Thus, unlike the 
name suggests, the NAC will be part of a 
contiguous urbanized area and a mere 
extension of the urban expansion of Cairo 
agglomeration. This spatial continuity is 
made clear by the fact that the mega-proj-
ect will not have its own governorate, but 
instead will be under the administrative 
responsibility of the governorate of Cairo 
(Hasan, “ Aʿṣima”).
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The Role of Foreign Investors
President and ministers pointed out sev-
eral times that the NAC is one of the main 
projects in Egypt to encourage foreign 
investments and to deepen international 
strategic construction of space was 
intended to counter critics, who feared 
that the project would be a burden for the 
Egyptian state and society.
In March 2015, the Dubai-based business-
man Muhammad al-Abbar was presented 
to the public as a potential investor. 
However, negotiations between him and 
the Ministry of Housing had already begun 
in summer 2014. A Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed, and two of 
Abbar’s companies, Capital City Partners 
and Eagle Hills, were supposed to assume 
a large share of the project development. 
In June 2015, the negotiations were can-
celled, and the cooperation was brought 
involvement of the foreign businessman 
came to a halt because he refused to 
involve his UAE-based company Emaar as 
a guarantor of loans. As a result, foreign 
could not be secured.
On the side of the Egyptian government, 
legal regulations constrained al-Abbar’s 
scope for maneuver, since the area of the 
future new city was not cleared of military 
units. In consequence, the construction 
was not likely to begin in the foreseeable 
authors’ interlocutors, this obstacle indi-
project stakeholders. The negotiations 
with al-Abbar were led mainly by the 
Ministry of Housing. Its former Minister, 
now additionally Prime Minister, Mustafa 
Madbuli, succeeded in excluding other 
ministries from the project development 
and took over its management (al-Sayyid). 
limited, even though the Armed Forces 
Engineering Authority was initially in 
charge of supervising construction. The 
military supposedly reacted and insisted 
on its legal right to keep all desert land 
that, by law, is owned by the Ministry of 
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Fig. 1: Location and Size of the New Administrative Capital in Relation to the Greater Cairo agglomeration
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intervention, it countered the takeover of 
the mega-project by the Ministry of 
Housing.
In December 2015, Presidential Decree 
No. 446 allowed the Armed Forces Land 
Projects Agency to “expand its commer-
cial activity and form for-profit corpora-
tions, both on its own and jointly with 
national and international capital sources” 
(ṣawāf). Among other things, this move 
enabled the military to participate in the 
negotiations about the development of 
the mega-project. Another presidential 
decree in February 2016 awarded the 
agency with the supervision of the con-
struction of two development projects, 
one of them being the NAC (ibid.).
The international scope of the military 
involvement was secured by two further 
incidents: first, representatives of the 
Armed Forces joined international dele-
gations to attract foreign investors and 
developers. Second and consequently, 
the military expanded its influence on 
international investors in August 2016, 
when a military-owned company was pro-
vided with the authority to give binding 
instructions to various international devel-
opers. Another blow to the Ministry of 
Housing already occurred in April 2016, 
with the establishment of a company 
called Administrative Capital Urban 
Development (ACUD), which was founded, 
among other things, to control the imple-
mentation of the many sub-projects in the 
new city. Whereas three of its 13 Members 
of the Board of Directors belonged to the 
Ministry of Housing, five members were 
related to the Armed Forces (Hasan, 
“Majlis”). Finally, in August 2017, General 
Aḥmed Ḏakī ʿAbdīn was appointed the 
new CEO of the ACUD, replacing a civilian, 
and was entrusted with substantial com-
petencies. His new deputy was General 
al-Laṭīf, the former managing director of 
the company.
Even though the Ministry of Housing con-
tinued to lead the negotiations with for-
eign investors, the Ministry of Defense had 
taken fierce control of the project devel-
opment. Recently though, there seems to 
be a downturn of military control. Some 
interview partners claim that the ACUD 
lost track of the various developers par-
ticipating in the NAC, something that ben-
efits the position of the Ministry of Housing. 
Its importance, though, seems to be 
reduced by the ambitious Investment 
Minister, Saḥar Naṣr, who sometime in 
early 2017 gained ground regarding the 
negotiations especially with Chinese for-
eign investors, engaged in the NAC’s busi-
ness district.
This example demonstrates that the 
Ministry of Housing and the military con-
tinuously engaged in a power struggle to 
gain control over the project development 
on the expenses of foreign investors. By 
helping the military to get a hold on the 
project, President al-Sisi, himself formerly 
a leading general in the Army, indirectly 
allocated new investment opportunities to 
the influential Egyptian military-economic 
complex. Therefore, officially framing the 
NAC as a space of international invest-
ment opportunities not only helped to 
counter public criticism, but also veiled 
the allocation of rent sources to the 
Egyptian military, which contributes to 
assuring the loyalty of the armed forces 
and is therefore vital to sustain Egypt’s 
continued “neopatrimonial” political sys-
tem of rule. (Pawelka)
The Disavowal of Responsibilities for 
Project Funding
The former Minister of Housing Mustafa 
Madbuli repeatedly advocated a strategic 
discursive construction of space in which 
the NAC would not cost the Egyptian state 
“a single cent”, but instead will make a 
profit for the Egyptian treasury (NUCA; 
Ghanīm and ʿAmāra). Other decision-
makers recurrently supported this argu-
mentation (Aḥmad; Ahram).
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Despite official statements, funding of the 
project was not as easy as hoped. Even 
though the NAC is considered to be a 
project of national significance, initial con-
cepts envisaged that private investors 
would finance the greater part – up to 83 
percent – of the project. However, inves-
tors dropped out because they did not 
expect an acceptable return for their 
involvement in costly endeavors like a 
national conference center and ministerial 
buildings. Although some private Egyptian 
developers stated that national compa-
nies would comprehensively support the 
project (e.g. Mounir), the state had to 
invest additional money to sustain the 
project. The scapegoat was the New 
Urban Communities Authority (NUCA), a 
sub-authority of the Ministry of Housing, 
originally founded in 1979 to supervise the 
development of new towns. From the very 
beginning, the authority had to inject 
money into the mega-project, especially 
indirectly via the ACUD, which was mainly 
financed from the budgets of the NUCA 
and the Armed Forces. Both hoped for 
returns on their participation in real estate 
projects. The NUCA, however, had to relin-
quish its responsibility in the new capital 
city to ACUD and to various independent 
companies and corporations and there-
fore lost influence on real estate sales. 
Thus, the NUCA became increasingly dis-
connected from the possibility to control 
the real estate revenues, which it needed 
to recoup its investments. At the moment, 
it seems very likely that the ACUD and the 
military are exploiting this reorganization 
by appropriating returns from land sales, 
which means that a new mechanism to 
transfer huge assets from the NUCA to the 
ACUD and the military has been imple-
mented. By April 2018, the authority had 
pumped loans and subsidies totaling at 
least 15 billion Egyptian pounds – around 
720 million Euro – into the mega-project, 
which will provide the ACUD and the mili-
tary with a multiple in revenues.
The head of another sub-authority of the 
Ministry of Housing in 2016 described the 
involvement of the NUCA as a way to pre-
vent the taxpayer from incurring any costs: 
“In fact, the national budget is not strained 
at all by the capital project because the 
NUCA took on the financing. This was in 
response to criticism that the Egyptian 
state squanders billions in this project” 
(Aḥmad).3 Ironically, at the same time, the 
financial involvement of the NUCA is used 
to bypass citizen participation. If a national 
authority finances the project and the citi-
zens do not bear any costs, then accord-
ing to some planner’s argumentation, citi-
zens do not have the right to ask for 
participation. A large number of urban 
planners and subordinates do not even 
see the necessity for further citizen par-
ticipation and show a derogatory attitude 
toward a more integrated form of plan-
ning. Instead, many perceive “people” and 
“government” as two entities that are dis-
tinct from each other – as formulated by an 
advisor of the Ministry of Housing: “In the 
case of the new capital, we don’t even 
need to think about asking the people, 
because it’s a national project.”
In sum, by shifting the financial burden to 
the NUCA, the government successfully 
pursued two aims: first, this made it pos-
sible to deny citizens a say in the mega-
project because they allegedly do not 
contribute to financing, and, second, the 
main stakeholders sustained their official 
strategic construction of space by shirking 
responsibility for project funding.
Locating the Presidential Palace
Interestingly enough, the location and size 
of the presidential palace is a topic that is 
considered thoroughly neither by the crit-
ical national or international media nor by 
the government in its strategic construc-
tions of space. In promotional videos and 
booklets on the NAC, the palace is not 
mentioned at all or only in passing by 
defining the palace as just one compo-
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nent of the governmental district (e.g. 
Oekoplan).
Initially, the palace was planned to be 
located in the heart of the new city. 
Together with the presidential advisory 
council on the mega-project, Chinese 
planners, who have been part of the proj-
in China in September 2015, played a key 
role in the conceptual design of the pal-
ace. The scheduled size of the palace dis-
trict of 9.5 km2 was not determined coin-
cidentally, but derived from the idea that 
the palace should be as large as the areas 
including the presidential complexes in 
the importance of the Egyptian president. 
In late autumn 2015, the palace compound 
was shifted to the northern border of the 
new city after the planners concluded that 
a more remote location might be safer. 
The new complex was even larger and 
measured 10.5 km2. The palace district was 
planned to be fully covered by manors 
and guesthouses, presidential gardens, 
and security buildings. A solar plant was 
supposed to make the palace indepen-
dent of the urban power supply. Some of 
the authors’ interlocutors claimed that, 
since then, the location of the palace has 
not changed, while by the beginning of 
around 6 km2, most probably because of 
Interesting as well is the composition of 
the governmental in relation to the palace 
district (which most tellingly are planned 
as two separate areas), which latter was 
sketched out and developed in coopera-
tion among Chinese and Egyptian compa-
nies, too. Initial plans aimed to develop 12 
ministry buildings in the NAC. Their relo-
cation from Cairo’s city center was 
defended by arguing that the ministries 
concerned did not need to deal with the 
citizens on a daily basis, even though they 
included the Ministry of Social Solidarity 
and the Ministry of Health and Population, 
which directly address concerns of the 
population. Six additional ministries suc-
cessfully demanded to join the relocation 
involved planner put it. As of the begin-
ministries and higher authorities are sup-
posed to move to the new district. The 
ministries will be built close to the south-
ern edge of the palace area, resembling a 
promenade directed toward the entrance 
of the palace. The Council of Ministers and 
the Parliament are located on the right 
and left sides of the north-south axis lead-
ing to the palace, as though they serve as 
its mere gatekeepers. The spatial compo-
the importance that is attached to various 
institutions, while the palace itself repre-
In sum, the available plans and our inter-
views indicate that it was the aim of the 
planning authorities from the very begin-
ning to bring a centralistic idea of urban 
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NAC before the reduction of the palace district
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absolutistic cities in Europe in the 17th 
century, this emphasizes the almost abso-
lute power of the head of state.
Conclusion
The analysis of three central elements of 
the NAC aimed at contrasting the officially 
created images of the project with the 
underlying and partially hidden interests 
of and power struggles among the main 
stakeholders in the production of urban 
space. We thereby demonstrated that the 
power relations within the project consti-
tute a complex field of organizational 
interests. We also revealed how decisive 
actors try to interpret and sometimes 
even hide essential information about the 
negotiations and financing connected to 
the NAC, as well as the location and size 
of one of its largest and politically most 
delicate sub-projects, the presidential 
palace.
Whereas official announcements repeat-
edly emphasize the role of foreign inves-
tors and private funding, our analysis 
demonstrates that the national Ministry of 
Housing and the military took over control 
of the project. The two Egyptian entities 
thereby engaged in a power struggle, 
which President al-Sisi decided in favor of 
the military. While the official framing of 
the NAC as a space for private interna-
tional investors counters public criticism 
of the project’s financial burden on the 
Egyptian state, this strategic construction 
of space also helped to veil the allocation 
of new rent sources to the Egyptian mili-
tary-economic complex, to which 
President Sisi himself belongs. This strate-
gic shift can be interpreted as a means to 
assure the loyalty of the armed forces in 
order to sustain the political system.
In this system, the president is the ulti-
mate source of power and wealth. This 
idea of statehood is mirrored in the cen-
tralistic concept of the NAC, which paral-
lels the model of absolutistic cities in 
Europe in the 17th century by putting the 
presidential palace in the very center of 
the project. Since this understanding of a 
modern Egyptian state contradicts demo-
cratic ideas, which fueled the revolt 
against the Mubarak regime, it is not sur-
prising that external and internal con-
structions of space are diverging and the 
role of the palace is not made a topic of 
public debate.
In line with these findings, it is not surpris-
ing, either, that the NAC can be seen as a 
counterexample of participative urban 
development. It is misleading, though, to 
locate the responsibility for these deficien-
cies exclusively at the top of the command 
chain, since urban planners often do not 
see the necessity and benefit of further 
citizen participation, either. In sum, it 
seems as if the development of the NAC 
unfortunately mirrors the Egyptian state’s 
undemocratic pathway of development 
after the overthrow of the Mubarak regime. 
Restoration is back again.
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